Mercer Law Review
Volume 49
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 11

12-1997

Torts
Deron R. Hicks

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Hicks, Deron R. (1997) "Torts," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 49 : No. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol49/iss1/11

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Torts
by Deron I. Hicks*
I.

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Battery
In Roberts v. Jones,1 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed whether
a physician commits battery by performing surgery on a patient to
alleviate pain despite the existence of a durable power of attorney
forbidding the surgery. In Jones prior to entering the hospital,
plaintiff's father executed a durable power of attorney that provided:
"I do not want to be operated on or any other treatment that will cause
pain and suffering.'2 The durable power of attorney also named
plaintiff and plaintiff's sister as the father's agents under a health
care agency power. During the course of plaintiffs father's hospitalization, defendant physician performed emergency surgery on plaintiff's
father after the father had not urinated for fourteen hours. The father
subsequently died due to reasons unrelated to the emergency surgery.
Although it was undisputed that the durable power of attorney was
contained in the father's medical records, it was also undisputed that
the physician had not been notified of the existence of the durable power
of attorney.' Plaintiff subsequently brought suit against the physician
for battery. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment," and the court of appeals affirmed.'
A.

* Associate in the firm of Self, Mullins, Robinson, Marchetti & Kamensky, P.C.,
Columbus, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.F.A, 1990); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1993). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 222 Ga. App. 548, 475 S.E.2d 193 (1996).
2. Id at 548, 475 S.E.2d at 194.
3. Id.
4. Id
5. Id. at 550, 475 S.E.2d at 195.
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The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment on two grounds. First, citing Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 31-36-7(1)," the court held that it was the
responsibility of the agent (the son or the daughter) to notify the
physician of the existence of the health care agency.7 Because it was
undisputed that the physician did not have actual notice of the durable
power of attorney, the physician could not be held liable for battery or
for violating the terms of that document."
Second, O.C.G.A. section 31-36-7(2f provides that a medical care
provider must comply with the decision of an agent in accordance with
the terms of the health care agency "subject to the provider's right to
administer treatment for the patient's comfort or alleviation of pain."'
Because plaintiff's father had not urinated for fourteen hours, the court
had little doubt that the father was in substantial pain." Accordingly,
even assuming that the physician knew or should have known of the
existence of the durable power of attorney, he was authorized pursuant
to O.C.G.A. section 31-36-7(2) to perform the emergency surgery. 2

6. O.C.GA. section 31-36-7(1) provides:
Each health care provider and each other person with whom an agent deals under
a health care agency shall be subject to the following duties and responsibilities:
(1) It is the responsibility of the agent or patient to notify the health care provider
of the existence of the health care agency and any amendment or revocation
thereof. A health care provider furnished with a copy of a health care agency shall,
make it a part of the patient's medical records and shall enter in the records any
change in or termination of the health care agency by the principal that becomes
known to the provider. Whenever a provider believes a patient is unable to
understand the general nature of the health care procedure which the provider
deems necessary, the provider shall consult with any available health care agent
known to the provider who then has the power to act for the patient under a
health care agency ....
O.C.G.A. § 31-36-7(1) (1996).
7. 222 Ga. App. at 549, 475 S.E.2d at 194.
8. Id.
9. O.C.GA. section 31-36-7(2) provides in part:
Each health care provider and each other person with whom an agent deals under
a health care agency shall be subject to the following duties and responsibilities:
(2) A health care decision made by an agent in accordance with the terms of a
health care agency shall be complied with by every health care provider to whom
the decision is communicated, subject to the provider's right to administer
treatment for the patient's comfort or alleviation of pain ....
O.C.G.A. § 31-36-7(2) (1996).
10. Id.
11. 222 Ga. App. at 549, 475 S.E.2d at 195.
12. Id. at 549-50, 475 S.E.2d at 195.
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B. False Imprisonment
O.C.G.A. section 51-7-60 provides a limited statutory privilege to
shopkeepers regarding the detention of suspected shoplifters. 8 The
decision in Brown u. Super Discount Markets, Inc.," however, underscores the difficulty in utilizing the statutory privilege as a shield
against a civil jury trial. As the court of appeals noted in Brown, a
defendant shopkeeper cannot "prevail on motion for summary judgment
unless the reasonableness of the initial decision to detain... and [the]
reasonableness of the manner and length15of [the] subsequent detention
...[are] established as a matter of law."
In Brown a security employee intercepted plaintiffs while they were
attempting to check out at defendant supermarket. The security
employee had observed plaintiffs concealing various items in their
purses. The security employee escorted plaintiffs to the store office,
where, according to defendants, they were briefly interrogated and
released. However, according to plaintiffs, the security employee
threatened them, used excessive force, and detained plaintiffs for
approximately an hour to an hour and a half.6
The court of appeals first held that the security employee had
reasonable cause to believe that shoplifting was in progress because he
had observed plaintiffs concealing various items in their purses.'
Therefore, the employee was authorized to intercept plaintiffs and to
investigate the situation further.'8

13. O.C.G.A. section 51-7-60 provides:
Whenever the owner or operator of a mercantile establishment or any agent or
employee of the owner or operator detains, arrests, or causes to be detained or
arrested any person reasonably thought to be engaged in shoplifting and, as a
result of the detention or arrest, the person so detained or arrested brings an
action for false arrest or false imprisonment against the owner, operator, agent,
or employee, no recovery shall be had by the plaintiff in such action where it is
established by competent evidence:
(1) That the plaintiff had so conducted himself or behaved in such a manner as
to cause a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the plaintiff, at or
immediately prior to the time of the detention or arrest, was committing the
offense of shoplifting, as defined by Code Section 16-8-14; or
(2) That the manner of the detention or arrest and the length of time during
which such plaintiff was detained was under all the circumstances reasonable.
O.C.GA. § 51-7-60 (1982).
14. 223 Ga. App. 174, 477 S.E.2d 839 (1996).
15. Id. at 175, 477 S.E.2d at 840.
16. Id. at 174-75, 477 S.E.2d at 83940.
17. Id. at 175, 477 S.E.2d at 840.
18. Id.
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The court, however, noted that "the circumstances surrounding the
detention are more problematic."19 The court said, "[Wihether the
manner and length of detention were reasonable may be determined as
a matter of law only in rare cases where the evidence is uncontroverted." 0 The court held that based upon the conflict in the evidence, a
jury would have to determine whether the manner and length of
plaintiffs' detention were reasonable. 1
In Ridgeview Institute, Inc. v. Handley," the court of appeals
addressed whether a claim of false imprisonment can be based upon a
hospital's failure to provide the statutory notice required by O.C.G.A.
section 37-3-44. 23 In Handley plaintiff was involuntarily committed to
defendant psychiatric facility after his daughter convinced a psychiatrist
that plaintiff was a danger both to himself and his wife. The psychiatrist completed a form 1013 authorizing a police officer to detain plaintiff
and bring him to the facility. During the admission process, plaintiff
claimed that the admitting nurse failed to notify plaintiff of his right to
retain legal counsel and of his right to seek a protective order or habeas
corpus relief under O.C.G.A. section 37-3-44. The following day, a
psychiatrist evaluated plaintiff and authorized his release after it was
determined that he did not need continued hospitalization. Plaintiff
subsequently brought suit against the psychiatrist and Ridgeview
Institute for false imprisonment. The trial court denied Ridgeview
Institute's motion for summary judgment.'
The court of appeals
reversed.'m
The court of appeals first noted, "False imprisonment is an intentional
tort and not a tort of negligence. Therefore, an essential element of a

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
224 Ga. App. 533, 481 S.E.2d 531 (1997).
O.C.G.A. section 37-3-44 provides:
(a) Immediately upon arrival of a patient at an emergency receiving facility
under Code Section 37-3-43, the facility shall give the patient written notice of his
right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus or for a protective order under Code
Section 37-3-148. This written notice shall also inform the patient that he has a
right to legal counsel and that, if the patient is unable to afford counsel, the court
will appoint counsel.
(b) The notice informing the patient's representatives of the patient's hospitalization in an emergency receiving facility shall include a clear notification that the
representatives may petition for a writ of habeas corpus or for a protective order
under Code Section 37-3-148.
O.C.G.A. § 37-3-44 (1995).
24. 224 Ga. App. at 533-35, 481 S.E.2d at 532-34.
25. Id. at 535, 481 S.E.2d at 534.
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claim for false imprisonment is an unlawful arrest or detention."'
Citing Williams v. Smith," a 1986 court of appeals decision, the court
held that "'[wihen the detention is predicated upon procedurally valid
process, false imprisonment is not an available remedy, regardless of the
motives upon which the process was secured ....

."

Accordingly,

because the form 1013 certificate was "facially valid," plaintiffs
hospitalization did not constitute an unlawful detention.'
Plaintiff, however, argued that although the initial detention may
have been lawful, the detention subsequently became unlawful when
Ridgeview Institute failed to provide plaintiff with the notice required
by O.C.G.A. section 37-3-44.' The court of appeals, however, rejected
plaintiff's argument."1 The court stated:
If we were to extend the definition of "process" in the manner advanced
by Handley and the trial court, then every negligent act or violation of
law accompanied by a detention-for example, the failure to read
Miranda warnings after a valid arrest-could give rise to a claim for

false imprisonment. This would, in effect, eliminate the element of
intent from the tort of false imprisonment and create a cause of action
for negligent false imprisonment, which is a tort our law does not
recognize. 32

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Seucech v. Ingles Markets, Inc.,' Duane and Kathy Sevcech sued
Ingles Markets, Inc. and three employees for "damages allegedly
resulting from Ingles wrongfully accusing Mr. Sevcech of shoplifting.'
While shopping at defendant grocery store, Mr. Sevcech was accused of
shoplifting by three employees of the grocery store." According to Mr.
Sevcech, he was taken to a store office "where he was accused of
shoplifting, assaulted and battered by an Ingles' [sic] employee."
Although no store merchandise was found on Mr. Sevcech, he was

26. Id. at 534, 481 S.E.2d at 533 (citations omitted).
27. 179 Ga. App. 712, 348 S.E.2d 50 (1986).
28. 224 Ga. App. at 534,481 S.E.2d at 533 (quoting Williams, 179 Ga. App. at 714,348

S.E.2d
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

at 53).
Id.
Id
Id, 481 S.E.2d at 534.
Id.
222 Ga. App. 221, 474 S.E.2d 4 (1996).
Id. at 221, 474 S.E.2d at 6.
Id.
Id. at 224, 474 S.E.2d at 8.
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arrested and placed in the back of a police car.87 Mr. and Mrs. Sevcech
subsequently brought suit against Ingles Market and its three employees
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court, however,
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.' The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Mr. Sevcech's
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.39
The court of appeals addressed the claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress of Mr. Sevcech and Mrs. Sevcech separately. With
respect to Mr. Sevcech's claim, the court of appeals noted that the trial
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis
that there was no evidence that Mr. Sevcech's emotional distress was

"severe.4

In reversing, the court noted the following:
Four elements must be present to support a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress: (1)The conduct must be intentional or
reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there
must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the
emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe ....

[T]he law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that
no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The distress must
be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there is no
liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable
emotional distress .... It is for the court to determine whether on the
evidence severe emotional distress can be found.41
In evaluating the reasonableness of the distress, the court first
determined whether defendants' conduct was outrageous or egregious.4 2
Based upon Mr. Sevcech's description of the incident, the court of
appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find
that defendants' conduct was outrageous.'
Furthermore, the court
concluded that a jury would be authorized to find that Mr. Sevcech's
reaction to the incident was not exaggerated." On this basis, the court
of appeals concluded that a jury issue existed with respect to Mr.
Sevcech's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.45

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 221, 474 S.E.2d at 6.
Id.
Id. at 223, 474 S.E.2d at 7.
Id. at 223-24, 474 S.E.2d at 7-8 (citations omitted).
1& at 224, 474 S.E.2d at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id
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The court of appeals, however, refused to reverse the trial court's grant
of summary judgment to defendants on Mrs. Sevcech's claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress."e The court noted that
"[i]mplicit in the requirement that the conduct be intentional is the
requirement that it be directed towards the complainant. Where the
conduct is directed towards others, not the complainant, he or she cannot
establish a necessary element of the claim." 7 Because defendants'
actions were not directed at Mrs. Sevcech, the court of appeals concluded
that Mrs. Sevcech's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
must fail. s
In Southeastern Security Insurance Co. v. Hotle,49 the court of appeals
affirmed a jury verdict on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in a sexual harassment context. The plaintiff in Hotle went to
work for defendant as a data entry clerk. After three months on the job,
codefendant James Alexander, vice president of defendant, became
During meetings with plaintiff, "Alexander
plaintiff's supervisor.'
would ask [plaintiff] questions such as: 'Did you get laid this weekend?'
or 'Did you get stuck this weekend?' or 'Did you have a two-on-one this
weekend?'" 5 Alexander would also refer to plaintiff and other female
employees as his "bitches."52 These comments as well as numerous
other actions of the codefendant and other management personnel
prompted plaintiff to bring suit against Southeastern Security Insurance
Company and James Alexander for intentional infliction of emotional
distress."'
In affirming the judgment, the court of appeals noted the following:
In order to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional harm
in a sexual harassment case, a "plaintiff must show 1)that defendant's
behavior was wilful and wanton or intentionally directed to harming
plaintiff; 2) that the actions of defendant were such as would naturally
humiliate, embarrass, frighten, or outrage the plaintiff; 3) that conduct

caused mental suffering or wounded feelings or emotional upset or
distress to plaintiff."'

46. Id.
47. Id. (citations omitted).
48. Id.

49. 222 Ga. App. 161, 473 S.E.2d 256 (1996).
50. Id. at 162, 473 S.E.2d at 259.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.

54. Id. at 163, 473 S.E.2d at 259-60.
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The court held that because some evidence had been presented by
plaintiff that would satisfy all three prongs of the test, the jury verdict
in favor of plaintiff must be affirmed.5
In a different employment-related context, however, the court of
appeals held that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
did not exist." In Bradley v. British Fitting Group, British Fitting
Group terminated Bradley's employment contract after his transfer from
London to Georgia. Subsequent to the termination, the parties executed
a mutual release agreement to settle Bradley's claim that he had been
wrongfully terminated. Seeking compensation for the alleged unfair
dismissal, Bradley filed a claim against British Fitting Group in the
United Kingdom Industrial Tribunal. In response, British Fitting Group
brought suit against Bradley in Georgia for breach of contract and fraud
for violation of the mutual release agreement. Bradley counterclaimed
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.5"
The trial court granted British Fitting Group's motion for summary
judgment on Bradley's claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and Bradley appealed." Bradley argued that the actions of
British Fitting Group were sufficient to give rise to a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. For example, Bradley argued that
British Fitting Group intentionally withheld money due Bradley under
his employment contract and that his formal written notice of termination, which requested that Bradley collect his personal effects from the
office and return company property, "was such as would naturally
humiliate and embarrass to an egregious extent someone in [his]
position. 59
The court of appeals, however, rejected Bradley's argument.' The
court noted that "'[tihe law intervenes only where the distress inflicted
is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure
it.'" 1 In this regard, the court pointed out that subsequent to Bradley's
termination, the parties had engaged in settlement negotiations on the
terms of Bradley's severance package, including the amount of compensation due. 2 The court held that even if British Fitting Group's
55. Id., 473 S.E.2d at 260.
56. Bradley v. British Fitting Group, PLC, 221 Ga. App. 621, 621, 472 S.E.2d 146, 148
(1996).
57. Id. at 621, 472 S.E.2d at 149.
58. Id., 472 S.E.2d at 148.
59. Id. at 625, 472 S.E.2d at 151.
60. Id. at 626, 472 S.E.2d at 152.
61. Id at 625, 472 S.E.2d at 151 (quoting Carroll v. Rock, 220 Ga. App. 260, 262, 469
S.E.2d 391, 394 (1996)).
62. Id. at 626, 472 S.E.2d at 151-52.
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"failure to settle at an earlier date was in bad faith, such conduct by
itself would be insufficient to support his claim.'
II.
A

NEGLIGENCE

PremisesLiability--Slip and Fall

The test for evaluating foreign substance slip and fall cases set forth
by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1980 in Alterman Foods, Inc. u.
Ligon" is simple:
[(In order to state a cause of action in a case where the plaintiff alleges
that due to an act of negligence by the defendant he slipped and fell on
a foreign substance on the defendant's floor, the plaintiff must show (1)
that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign
substance and (2) that the plaintiff was without knowledge of the
substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was
prevented from discovering the foreign substance.'
How this two-prong test is to be applied, however, has literally divided
the Georgia Court of Appeals in the years since the Alterman Foods
decision. Two different approaches to applying the test have arisen in
the court of appeals. As anyone generally familiar with the area of slip
and fall law in Georgia is aware, these approaches to the application of
the Alterman Foods test are identified with two judges on the court of
appeals: Presiding Judge William McMurray and Judge Gary Andrews.
Judge Andrews has adopted a very formalistic approach to the application of the Alterman Foods test, resulting more often than not in the
grant of summary judgment to defendants. On the other hand, Judge
McMurray views the Alterman Foods test as a flexible tool to guide the
trial court and the fact finder's evaluation of the evidence but not as a
basis for withdrawing the issues of negligence and knowledge from the
fact finder's consideration. Therefore, Judge McMurray's approach to
the Alterman Foods test generally results in a determination that a
question of fact exists for the jury, thus precluding summary judgment.
Over the course of the last year, there have been a number of slip and
fall decisions rendered by the Georgia Court of Appeals in which Judge
Andrews either wrote the majority opinion or joined in the majority
opinion, and in which the court either affirmed the grant of summary
judgment to a defendant or reversed the trial court's denial of such a

63. Id., 472 S.E.2d at 152.
64. 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980).
66. Id. at 623, 272 S.E.2d at 330.
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motion. These decisions -include Blake v. Kroger Co.,' Hornbuckle
Wholesale Florist of Macon, Inc. v. Castellaw,7 Rodriquez v. City of
Augusta,' and Columbus Doctors Hospital, Inc. v. Thompson.6 9 In
Blake and Rodriquez, the court of appeals affirmed the grant of
summary judgment to defendant proprietors on the basis that defendants did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged
foreign substance.7" In Thompson and Castellaw, the court of appeals
reversed the trial courts' denial of defendants' motions for summary
judgment because plaintiffs had failed to establish that defendants had
actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition."
In Furlong v. Crystal Chandelier,Inc.,72 Arwood v. Tzen, 73 Ingram
v. Toccoa Triple Cinema, Inc.,7' Davis v. Piedmont Hospital, Inc.,7
6 the court of appeals held
and Service Merchandise, Inc. v. Jackson,"
that a question of fact existed with respect to the knowledge of either the
proprietor or the plaintiff, thereby precluding judgment as a matter of
law in favor of the defendant.77 In each of the decisions, Judge
McMurray either wrote the majority opinion or joined in the court's
decision.
The differences separating the two wings of the court cannot be
overstated. The disagreement is not simply over the technical application of the Alterman Foods test; rather, the dispute centers in large part
around the role of the jury in resolving disputed issues of fact. This
division on the court of appeals has at times taken on a personal note.
For example, the following is a quote from Judge Blackburn's amended
dissent in Blake in which he addresses the current state of slip and fall
law as characterized by Judge Andrews's majority approach:
I would implore the Supreme Court of Georgia or the Georgia
legislature to restore to victims the right to have their cases tried by

66. 224 Ga. App. 140, 480 S.E.2d 199 (1996).
67. 223 Ga. App. 198, 477 S.E.2d 348 (1996).
68. 222 Ga. App. 383, 474 S.E.2d 278 (1996).
69. 224 Ga. App. 682, 482 S.E.2d 705 (1997).
70. 224 Ga. App. at 145, 480 S.E.2d at 203; 222 Ga. App. at 384-85, 474 S.E.2d at 27980.
71. 224 Ga. App. at 684, 482 S.E.2d at 707; 223 Ga. App. at 200, 477 S.E.2d at 351.
72. 223 Ga. App. 574, 478 S.E.2d 396 (1996).
73. 224 Ga. App. 722, 481 S.E.2d 874 (1997).
74. 222 Ga. App. 409, 474 S.E.2d 293 (1996).
75. 222 Ga. App. 97, 473 S.E.2d 531 (1996).
76. 221 Ga. App. 897, 473 S.E.2d 209 (1996).
77. 223 Ga. App. at 575,478 S.E.2d at 398; 224 Ga. App. at 725,481 S.E.2d at 876; 222
Ga. App. at 411, 474 S.E.2d at 295; 222 Ga. App. at 99, 473 S.E.2d at 533; 221 Ga. App.
at 899, 473 S.E.2d at 211.
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their peers and to release the stranglehold this Court has imposed

upon victims' rights through judicial activism and an improper
usurpation of the authority of Georgia juries. 8
It appears that other members of the court of appeals, although
sharing in Judge Blackburn and Judge McMurray's view of the court's
slip and fall jurisprudence, nonetheless feel constrained to adhere to the
formalistic approach mandated in Alterman Foods and championed by
Judge Andrews. For example, in Coffey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,7 9 a
three-judge panel, in affirming the grant of summary judgment to
defendant, wrote:
Our Supreme Court has not yet rejected or revised the Alterman Foods
standards, and consequently they remain binding on this Court even
though we may now believe we have a better concept for allocating the
burdens on the parties. Nevertheless, because of recent divergences
within this Court in slip and fall cases, perhaps it is time for the

Supreme Court to revisit this issue.'
Apparently, the Georgia Supreme Court now stands ready to meet the
challenge. In Robinson v. Kroger Co., the supreme court granted
certiorari to review the court of appeals' affirmance of the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a slip and fall
case. Robinson, argued before the court on April 24, 1997, appears to be
the first effort by the supreme court to address the inconsistencies that
have developed over the last seventeen years in the application of the
Alterman Foods test and, perhaps, to revisit the test altogether. As of
the date of publication, the court has yet to issue its opinion in
Robinson.

III.

IMPUTED AND RELATIONAL LiABiLrrY

A.

Corporations
In Kissun v. Humana, Inc.,'2 the Georgia Supreme Court addressed
"whether a parent corporation can be held liable for the acts or
omissions of a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation under theories of
apparent or ostensible agency or joint venturer where the evidence is

78.
79.
80.
81.
1997).
82.

224 Ga. App. at 157, 480 S.E.2d at 211 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
224 Ga. App. 824, 482 S.E.2d 720 (1997).
Id. at 829, 482 S.E.2d at 724 (citations omitted).
222 Ga. App. 711, 476 S.E.2d 29 (1996), rev'd post-survey, No. F97G0065 (Dec. 3,
267 Ga. 419, 479 S.E.2d 751 (1997).
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insufficient to pierce the corporate veil."" In Kissun plaintiffs brought
suit for wrongful death and medical malpractice against a hospital and
the hospital's parent corporation. The trial court denied the parent
corporation's motion for summary judgment, and the parent corporation
appealed." The court of appeals reversed and held that because there
was insufficient evidence to pierce the corporate veil between the parent
corporation and its subsidiary, "there could be no claim against [the
under either an apparent agency or a joint venturer
parent corporation]
5
theory.n
The supreme court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the
court of appeals.86 The court noted that three separate theories of
liability were at issue: alter ego liability, apparent or ostensible agency,
and joint venture. The court held that although the three theories "are
closely intertwined with one another," the proof necessary to establish
liability under each theory is not necessarily interchangeable." The
court stated:
(Wihile there may be instances where evidence to pierce the corporate
veil also serves to establish an agency relationship between the
corporate parties, it cannot be held as a matter of law that evidence
insufficient to pierce the corporate veil automatically serves to negate

the existence of an agency relationship between the corporations.'
IV NEGLIGENCE DEFENSES
9 the court of appeals expanded the defense
In Griffiths v. Schafer,O
of assumption of the risk with respect to civil actions filed by veterinary
employees as a result of dog bites. Plaintiff in Griffiths, a veterinary
technician, sued defendant, the owner of an Akita dog, after the dog
attacked plaintiff while she was attempting to place a collar on the dog.
Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for summary
judgment.' The court of appeals reversed and held that plaintiff had
assumed the risk of a dog bite.91

83. Id. at 419, 479 S.E.2d at 752.
84. Id
85. Id.
86. Id.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

I& at 420, 479 S.E.2d at 752.
Id., 479 S.E.2d at 753.
223 Ga. App. 560, 478 S.E.2d 625 (1996).
I& at 560, 478 S.E.2d at 626.
Id. at 562-63, 478 S.E.2d at 627.
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In reaching its decision, the court of appeals relied upon its prior
decision in Lundy v. Stuhr2 that a kennel attendant assumed the risk
of a dog bite when the attendant had knowledge of the dog's violent
propensity and ignored the dog's aggressive behavior while retrieving a
water bowl from the dog's cage." However, notwithstanding the
apparent contributory negligence of the kennel attendant in Lundy, the
court of appeals in Griffiths stated that the court "affirmed the summary
judgment to the dog owner in Lundy, on the basis of the general doctrine
of assumption of risk by workers in certain professions."9 According
to the court of appeals, "[It is not necessary to the assumption of the
risk that [plaintiff) acted negligently, as Lundy perhaps did in his
sudden movement in the Lundy case. Assumption of the risk is a matter
of knowledge of the danger and intelligent acquiescence in it. 5
The court cautioned, however, that its holding did not "establish that
there is an immutable, absolute assumption of risk by veterinary
employees in handling animals."6 According to the court, there may
be circumstances when the veterinary employee is misled by the dog
owner about tendencies of a certain dog or when the violent tendencies
of a dog far exceed what would reasonably be expected.' Under those
circumstances, the veterinary employee would not be deemed to have
assumed the risk of injury."
V.

OTHER TORT CAUSES OF ACTION

A. ProductsLiability
During the past year, a number of very significant decisions were
rendered in the area of products liability law. In large part, these
decisions have been the result of the 1994 Georgia Supreme Court
decision in Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc."
For example, in Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,Wo the
Georgia Supreme Court addressed the following certified question from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: "When an
automobile manufacturer sells an automobile to a Georgia citizen and

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

185 Ga. App. 72, 363 S.E.2d 343 (1987).
Id. at 75, 363 S.E.2d at 346.
223 Ga. App. at 561, 478 S.E.2d at 626.
Id. at 562, 478 S.E.2d at 627.
Id. at 562-63, 478 S.E.2d at 627.
Id. at 563, 478 S.E.2d at 627.
Id.
264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994).
267 Ga. 574, 481 S.E.2d 518 (1997).
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the automobile is in compliance with the National Automobile Safety
Act, does Georgia law preclude a personal injury product liability
claim?"'
The supreme court said, "The answer to this question is
- I02
no.

The court held that "Georgia common law permits a Georgia citizen to
sue an automobile manufacturer despite the manufacturer's compliance
with the standards established by the National Automobile Safety
Act."" °s Relying upon the risk-utility test set forth in Banks,' 4 the
court held that "compliance with federal standards or regulations is a
factor for the jury to consider in deciding the question of reasonableness,
that is, whether the product design selected was a reasonable one from
among the feasible choices of. which the manufacturer was aware or
should have been aware." 5 The court expressly overruled the 1988
decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in Honda Motor Co. v.
Kimbrelf °c to the extent that it conflicted with the standards set forth
in Banks for product liability design defect cases.0"
In S K Hand Tool Corp. v. Lowman,'ec the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered whether, in light of the Banks decision, a professional
malpractice affidavit under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1'0° is required for
a claim of strict liability under O.C.G.A. section 51-1-11.1 ° In Lowman plaintiff was injured while attempting to reattach a sharpened lawn
mower blade to a mower using a ratchet designed and manufactured by

101. Id. at 574, 481 S.E.2d at 519.
102. Id.

103. Id.
104. In Banks the court adopted the risk-utility test for evaluating products liability
claims:
To arrive at the appropriate test for reaching the legal conclusion that a product's
design specifications were partly or totally defective, this Court has conducted an
exhaustive review of foreign jurisdictions and learned treatises. That review has
revealed a general consensus regarding the utilization in design defect cases of a
balancing test whereby the risks inherent in a product design are weighed against
the utility or benefit derived from the product. This risk-utility analysis
incorporates the concept of "reasonableness," i.e., whether the manufacturer acted
reasonably in choosing a particular product design, given the probability and
seriousness of the risk posed by the design, the usefulness of the product in that
condition, and the burden on the manufacturer to take the necessary steps to
eliminate the risk.
264 Ga. at 734, 450 S.E.2d at 673 (citations omitted).
105. 267 Ga. at 577, 481 S.E.2d at 521.
106. 189 Ga. App. 414, 376 S.E.2d 379 (1988).
107. 267 Ga. at 577 n.14, 481 S.E.2d at 521 n.14.
108. 223 Ga. App. 712, 479 S.E.2d 103 (1996).
109. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1997).
110. Id. § 51-1-11; 223 Ga. App. at 712, 479 S.E.2d at 104.
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S K Hand Tool Corporation. Plaintiff brought suit against S K Hand
Tool Corporation on the basis that the ratchet was defective and not
reasonably suited for the purpose for which it was manufactured.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the failure of plaintiff to
file an expert affidavit in accordance with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1. The
trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss." The court of
appeals affirmed on interlocutory appeal.'
On appeal defendant argued that the supreme court's adoption of the
risk-utility test in Banks incorporated basic negligence principles into
the trier of fact's assessment of defectiveness. 13 In Banks the
supreme court "'recognize[d] that the determination of whether a product
was defective (involving the reasonableness of the manufacturer's
design decisions), which is a basic inquiry for strict liability purposes,
generally will overlap the determination of whether the manufacturer's
conduct was reasonable, which is a basic inquiry for negligence
purposes.'""' 4 Based in part on this portion of the Banks decision,
defendant argued that because the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct could be at issue in the application of the risk-utility test,
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 required the filing of an expert affidavit."'
The court of appeals, however, while recognizing that "Banks does
seem to blur the distinction Georgia cases have historically made
between negligence and strict liability claims,"" nonetheless held that
a distinction still exists between strict liability and negligence theories." 7 The court of appeals stated:
Simply put, a claim for professional malpractice depends upon negligence principles-standards of reasonableness as related to professional
services. A claim for strict product liability-whether the problem is
manufacture or design-however, depends upon whether a product was
defective. While negligence principles may now be utilized in the
determination of whether a product was defectively designed, a viable
distinction nonetheless remains between claims alleging strict liability
and those alleging provision of negligent professional services.' 8

111.
112.
113.
114.
n.3).
115.
116.
117.
118.

223 Ga. App. at 712, 479 S.E.2d at 104-05.
Id.
Id. at 714-15, 479 S.E.2d at 106-07.
Id. at 715, 479,S.E.2d at 106 (quoting Banks, 264 Ga. at 735 n.3, 450 S.E.2d at 671
1& at 714, 479 S.E.2d at 106.
Id. at 715, 479 S.E.2d at 106.
1&
Id. at 716, 479 S.E.2d at 107.
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The court of appeals also struggled with the Banks decision in
Sharpnack v. Hoffinger Industries, Inc."' In Sharpnack the court of
appeals addressed whether the court in Banks abolished the defense of
assumption of risk for product liability claims. The plaintiff in
Sharpnack was rendered a quadriplegic when he dove into an aboveground swimming pool."s
During the course of discovery, it was
revealed that plaintiff "had used the pool on several occasions the
previous summer and was familiar with the pool's uniform three and
a half to four foot depth."12' Plaintiff also testified that he was
"familiar with hazards associated with diving into such shallow
water.""s
The trial court granted the defendant manufacturer's
motion for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff had assumed
the risk of serious injury by diving into the pool.'
The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's decision."
According to the majority, the Banks risk-utility analysis did not
preclude the grant of summary judgment in a situation "in which it is
palpably clear that the plaintiff assumed the risk of his injuries and as
clear that his own action was the sole proximate cause of his injuries.""2 In reaching its decision, the court of appeals noted that no
appellate court in Georgia had addressed whether the risk-utility
analysis precluded summary judgment in products liability cases. 1"
However, the court did note that two federal district courts in Georgia
had addressed the issue. 27 Although the two federal district courts
reached different conclusions, both courts concluded that the risk-utility
analysis set forth in Banks did not preclude summary judgment in
products liability cases." s
In at least one of the federal district court decisions cited by the court
of appeals, the district court held that based upon the Banks decision,
the open and obvious danger rule no longer applied in products liability
cases."2 However, that same court, based upon a review of the law in
the jurisdictions cited by the supreme court in Banks, concluded that

119. 223 Ga. App. 833, 479 S.E.2d 435 (1996).
120.

Id. at 833, 479 S.E.2d at 435.

121. Id.
122. Id., 479 S.E.2d at 435-36.
123. Id. at 834, 479 S.E.2d at 436.

124.
125.
126.
127.
Equip.
128.
129.

Id. at 836, 479 S.E.2d at 437.
Id at 835, 479 S.E.2d at 436.
Id.
See Raymond v. Amada Co., 925 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Morris v. Clark
Co., 904 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
See Raymond, 925 F. Supp. at 1578; Morris, 904 F. Supp. at 1383;.
Raymond, 925 F. Supp. at 1578.
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assumption
of the risk remained a viable defense under the risk-utility
130
analysis.
Judge McMurray, however, concluded in his dissent that although
plaintiff's knowledge of dangers associated with a particular product
may be considered by the jury in applying the risk-utility analysis, that
factor alone no longer warranted summary judgment. 181 Judge
McMurray stated:
[T]he Supreme Court expressly states in Banks that a user's
knowledge of a product and ability to avoid dangers associated with use
of the product are merely factors the trier of fact may consider-under
a risk-utility analysis-in determining whether the manufacturer
breached its duty under O.C.G.A. [section] 51-1-11(b) and thus whether
any such defect was a proximate cause of resulting injuries.'
In NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson," the Georgia Supreme Court
adopted a new test for defining "unconscionability" in the context of a
claim for breach of warranty. Plaintiffs brought suit against Curtis
Mathes Corporation to recover for property damage they sustained in a
fire allegedly caused by a defect in a television set they had purchased."3 The television set came with an express warranty that
The trial
"Exclude[d] All Incidental and Consequential Damages."'
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the
express warranty and held that the exclusion was not unconscionable as
a matter of law. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court. 136 The supreme court, however, granted certiorari and then
reversed the decision of the court of appeals.' 3
The supreme court noted that "Georgia law expressly allows manufacturers of products to limit or exclude consequential damages.""S The
manufacturer, however, may not limit or exclude damages when the
result would be unconscionable." 3 Although the court recognized that
a limitation on consequential property damages in the case of consumer
goods is not prima facie unconscionable," 4 it nonetheless addressed

130. Id. at 1579.
131. Sharpnack, 223 Ga. App. at 837, 479 S.E.2d at 438 (McMurray, J., dissenting).
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133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id
267 Ga. 390, 478 S.E.2d 769 (1996).
Id. at 390, 478 S.E.2d at 770.
Id.
Id.
Id., 478 S.E.2d at 771.
Id.
Id.

140. Id. at 391, 478 S.E.2d at 771.
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whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case at
hand, the express warranty was unconscionable."'
The Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") and the Georgia U.C.C. do
not define unconscionability. Accordingly, the court first set forth the
basic test for evaluating unconscionability under Georgia law: "whether,
in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial
needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so onesided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the contract. 142 Although this general definition
provided the court with some guidance on the meaning of unconscionability, the process by which this evaluation is conducted had yet to be
Accordingly, the court found it
developed under Georgia law.1"
appropriate to review certain foreign authorities in evaluating how the
issue of unconscionablilty should be resolved. 1"
The court noted that other jurisdictions have generally divided the
relevant factors into procedural and substantive elements:'
Procedural unconscionablilty addresses the process of making the
contract, while substantive unconscionability looks to the contractual
terms themselves. A non-inclusive list of some factors courts have
considered in determining whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable includes the age, education, intelligence, business acumen
and experience of the parties, their relative bargaining power, the
conspicuousness and comprehensibility of the contract language, the
oppressiveness of the terms, and the presence or absence of a meaningful choice. As to the substantive elements of unconscionability, the
courts have focused on matters such as the commercial reasonableness
of the contract terms, the purpose and effect of the terms, the
allocation of the risk between the parties, and similar public policy
concerns.14
The supreme court adopted this review of the procedural and substantive
elements of unconscionability as the appropriate analysis under Georgia
law for evaluating unconscionability. 47 In applying the proceduralsubstantive analysis to the case before the court, the court concluded
that the express warranty at issue was neither procedurally nor
substantively unconscionable.'" In arriving at this conclusion, the

141. Id

142. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1977)).
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 392, 478 S.E.2d at 771.
Id., 478 S.E.2d at 771-72 (citations omitted).
Id., 478 S.E.2d at 772.
Id. at 393-94, 478 S.E.2d at 772-73.
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court reviewed the specific circumstances of the transaction, the terms
of the express warranty, the knowledge of the consumer plaintiff, and
49
the conspicuousness of the warranty."
The court also appears to suggest in Nelson that the resolution of the
procedural unconscionability issue may be determinative of the
unconscionability issue as a whole."5 On the facts before the court,
however, because the express warranty lacked both procedural and
substantive unconscionability, the court did not find it necessary to
resolve this particular issue.'
Between procedural and substantive
unconscionability, however, it appears the resolution of the procedural
unconscionability issue may be determinative if different conclusions are
reached with respect to the two prongs of the test.
B. Defamation
Publication is an essential element of a claim for libel. In Carter v.
Hubbard, 2 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to defendant on the basis that there was no
publication of the allegedly libelous material. '
In Carter after
plaintiff, a salesman, resigned his employment with defendant, a lock
and safe company, a corporate officer of defendant received information
that plaintiff was attempting to solicit a job with a competitor by
providing confidential business information that he obtained during the
course of his employment with defendant. In response to this information, defendant sent plaintiff a letter in which defendant addressed the
unauthorized use of corporate information. The letter indicated that
carbon copies were sent to two individuals who were not employed by
defendant.1 "
Plaintiff subsequently brought suit against defendant for libel.
According to plaintiff, by forwarding a copy of the allegedly libelous
letter to the two individuals who were not employed by defendant,
defendant published the material, thus satisfying a necessary element
of plaintiff's prima facie case.155 However, in moving for summary
judgment, defendant submitted the affidavits of the two individuals to
whom the letter was allegedly copied. According to the affidavits, the
two individuals never received a copy of the correspondence and had not

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 394, 478 S.E.2d at 773.
Id.
224 Ga. App. 375, 480 S.E.2d 382 (1997).
Id. at 377, 480 S.E.2d at 384.
Id at 376, 480 S.E.2d at 384.
Id, 480 S.E.2d at 383-84.
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read the allegedly libelous letter. An employee of defendant testified
that although he indicated on the letter that it was copied to the two
individuals,
the letter was in fact sent only to employees of defen1
dant.

6

The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on
the basis that there was no evidence that the letter was published to
individuals outside defendant's corporate structure. 157 The court of
appeals affirmed." The court of appeals stated:
In this case, even if we assumed the evidence authorized a finding that
any of the defendants sent the letter to Williams or Blake, the
affidavits and deposition testimony presented by the defendants in
support of their motion clearly show that neither of those two individuals received or read the letter. The defendants accordingly have met
their burden of showing by the record that the letter was not published
to a third party. 59
In Strange v. Henderson,' ° the court of appeals dealt with the issue
of defamation via a radio or television broadcast--often referred to as
"defamacast." In Strange plaintiff brought suit against defendant for
comments that were made by defendant during the course of a radio talk
show. Defendant had called into a radio talk show to discuss a fire that
had occurred at a building owned by plaintiff. During the course of the
broadcast, defendant alleged that plaintiff was the owner of the building,
that plaintiff was attempting to secure government funds to rebuild the
building, and that plaintiff was delinquent in his property taxes on the
property. During the course of discovery, defendant admitted that he
had conducted no research to confirm the statements he made during the
broadcast; the statements ultimately proved to be false. The jury
returned a verdict of twenty-five thousand dollars in favor of plaintiff. 6 ' Defendant appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the
judgment 62
On appeal defendant argued that the trial court erred in permitting
plaintiff to introduce into evidence portions of his appearance on the talk
radio show in which he discussed topics that did not involve plaintiff or
plaintiff's business. These topics included comments by defendant
regarding abortion and religion. Defendant contended that the

156. Id., 480 S.E.2d at 384.
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Id. at 377, 480 S.E.2d at 384.
Id.
223 Ga. App. 218, 477 S.E.2d 330 (1996).
Id. at 218-19, 477 S.E.2d at 331.
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statements were immaterial, irrelevant, and prejudicial." The court
of appeals, however, held that the jury was entitled to hear all of defendant's comments on the talk radio show in their proper context."'
The court of appeals stated:
The statements regarding abortion and religion, which the appellant
wants to exclude, are relevant to the case because they provide a
context from which the jury could have inferred that, rather than
serving a legitimate public service, appellant instead was acting
maliciously to incite the public with a reckless disregard for the truth
.... To be defamatory, a statement must be both false and malicious;
therefore, the jury's determination regarding Appellant's motivations
in making the statements at issue is material to the case sub judice,
and the statements were properly admitted into evidence for the
jury's consideration.'
C.

Wrongful Death
In the absence of a spouse or children, the right to recover for the
wrongful death of a child belongs to the parents of the child. O.C.G.A.
section 19-7-1(b)(3),'" however, provides in part: "Parental power
shall be lost by ... abandonment of the child."" In Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Adams,'" the court of appeals addressed the application of O.C.G.A. section 19-7-1(b)(3) in the context of a claim for
wrongful death filed by the mother of the deceased child. In Adams
plaintiff brought suit against defendant for the wrongful death of her
child after her daughter was killed in a car accident. Defendant moved
for the trial court to dismiss the action on the basis that plaintiff had
abandoned her child and, therefore, was not a proper party plaintiff.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals
affirmed.'69
The court of appeals held that to establish abandonment, there must
be clear and convincing evidence of (1) actual desertion of the child and
(2) an intent to sever the parental relationship. 70 After plaintiff was
divorced from the deceased child's father, plaintiff had custody of the
child. However, plaintiff subsequently gave custody of the child to the
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Id. at 220, 477 S.E.2d at 332.
Id. at 221, 477 S.E.2d at 333.
Id. (citations omitted).
O.C.G_.A § 19-7-1(b)(3) (1991).
Id.
221 Ga. App. 705, 472 S.E.2d 518 (1996).
Id. at 705, 472 S.E.2d at 519.
Id. at 706, 472 S.E.2d at 519.
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child's father, with whom the child remained for the rest of her life.
During the remainder of the child's fife, plaintiff allegedly did not
provide any financial support for the child.'7 1 The court of appeals,
however, held that the evidence was insufficient to establish abandonment of the child. 172 According to the court, "[tihe mere delivery of
custody of a child to another... is not sufficient to constitute abandonment."73 Further, the court recognized that "mere failure of a parent
to provide support for a minor child who is in the possession or custody
of another person" does not constitute abandonment within the meaning
of O.C.G.A. section 19-7-1(b)(3). 74 Therefore, the court held that
plaintiff was a proper party to bring the wrongful death action for the
death of her child.7 5
D.

Torts Arising from Business Relations-Trade Secrets
In Stargate Software International, Inc. v. Rumph,"76 the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment 1to
77
defendants on plaintiff's claim under the Georgia Trade Secrets Act.
Plaintiff contracted with a paper producer to develop software to control
industrial operations. After experiencing difficulties in performing its
contractual obligations, the paper producer instructed plaintiff to seek
the assistance of defendant in completing the project. 178 During the
course of negotiations with defendant, plaintiff's chief executive officer
suggested to plaintiff's employees "that they become [defendant's]
employees and continue working on the ... project at [plaintiff's]
offices. " 1 79 The relationship between plaintiff and defendant deteriorated after plaintiff accused defendant of stealing certain records and
computers from plaintiff's offices. Plaintiff subsequently brought suit
against defendant for misappropriation of trade secrets.'o
On appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
defendants, plaintiff asserted that "the software and documents it had
prepared for the ... projects were trade secrets and that [defendants]
misappropriated them through the work of former [employees of

171,
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
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180.

Id.
Id., 472 S.E.2d at 520.
Id, 472 S.E.2d at 519.
I&, 474 S.E.2d at 520 (citations omitted).
Id. at 707, 472 S.E.2d at 520.
224 Ga. App. 873, 482 S.E.2d 498 (1997).
O.C.GA. § 10-1-760 to -767 (1994).
224 Ga. App. at 874, 482 S.E.2d at 501.
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plaintiff] and by taking computer software and program documentation."18"
The court of appeals, however, held that plaintiff had not
taken reasonable efforts to protect the confidentiality of its trade
secrets.' 2
The evidence established that plaintiff had its employees execute
agreements containing confidentiality provisions and had established
password protection on its computer network-1 3 Although the court
of appeals recognized that the agreements may under appropriate
circumstances constitute reasonable efforts to protect confidentiality, the
agreements and other measures were not sufficient under the particular
facts of the case.' In reaching its decision, the court wrote:
[Plaintiff] did not simply suggest its employees work for [defendant]
and see them go to a competitor, it told them to work for [defendant]
on the continuing... projects. Transferring the employees with such
a charge necessarily gave (defendant] access to trade secrets. When
telling its former employees to work for [defendant], [plaintiff] gave no
instructions as to confidentiality of documentation on the projects. As
a matter of law, given the circumstances, [plaintiff's] efforts were not
reasonable
to maintain secrecy of any trade secrets concerning the...
1
projects. 5
VI. DAMAGES
In Russaw v.
the court of appeals was confronted with "an
issue of first impression in Georgia as to the scope of permissible
damages for mental distress based on a non-sterile needle strike
injury. " " The plaintiff in Russaw was awaiting treatment for her
daughter at defendant's emergency room. An emergency room nurse,
who was attempting to remove keys from her pocket, accidentally
dropped a used syringe onto plaintiff's thigh, striking and puncturing
plaintiff's thigh. The syringe had apparently been used by the nurse to
administer medication to an elderly patient. Both plaintiff and the
elderly patient subsequently tested negative for hepatitis and HIV.
Plaintiff subsequently brought suit against the emergency room nurse
and defendant hospital for negligence, battery, reckless conduct, and loss
of consortium. The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment on
Martin,1"

181. 1o at 876, 482 S.E.2d at 502.
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plaintiff's claim for mental distress damages arising out of the incident.
Although the trial court granted the hospital's motion for summary
judgment on plaintiff's mental anguish claim that was based on fear of
contracting hepatitis or AIDS in the future, the trial court held that
plaintiff had a potentially compensable claim for mental anguish from
the time of the physical injury until the negative results of the first HV
test.' The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.'
According to the court of appeals, "Georgia appellate courts have not
yet confronted the issues of 1) whether a Plaintiff can recover damages
premised on a fear of developing AIDS; or 2) whether such fear is
unreasonable as a matter of law in the absence of proof of actual
exposure to HIV." ' Because the issues presented by the case were of
first impression in Georgia, the court first reviewed how other jurisdictions have dealt with these same issues. 91 '
Two lines of authority have developed in other jurisdictions with
respect to whether a plaintiff can recover mental distress damages
premised on a fear of developing AIDS. The majority of jurisdictions
require actual exposure to disease as a prerequisite to recovery of
This approach is based in part on the fact that "the
damages.'
statistical probability of contracting HIV from a single, needle stick
exposure ... is only approximately 0.3 to 0.5 percent." 93 The court
noted, however, that "[a] few jurisdictions permit recovery under a
'window of anxiety' theory whereby a person possibly exposed to HrV can
recover for anxiety and emotional distress up to the point of receiving
definitive negative test results."'" According to the court of appeals,
the trial court apparently adopted the "window of anxiety" theory in
ruling upon defendant's motion for summary judgment.'" The court
of appeals, however, rejected the window of anxiety theory in favor of the
majority rule.'" The court of appeals stated:
It is axiomatic that for recovery, there must be some reasonable
connection between the act or omission of a defendant and the damages
which a plaintiff has suffered. Without factual evidence of a causal
connection between the alleged breach of duty and the purported
damages, the damages must be considered whimsical, fanciful and
188.
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above all too speculative to form the basis of recovery under O.C.G.A.
[section] 51-12-8 .... TO allow recovery for emotional injuries and
mental anguish, without any proof whatsoever that [plaintiff] was
actually exposed to HIV or hepatitis is per se unreasonable.'
In Smith v. Crump,"' the court of appeals rejected defendant's
argument that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for
remittitur on the ground that the jury verdict was excessive.' 8
Plaintiff in Smith was seriously injured when she was in an automobile
accident with defendant. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant and
obtained a jury verdict in the amount of $1,050,597. Defendant filed a
motion for remittitur or, in the alternative, a motion for new trial based
in part on his contention that the jury verdict was excessive. Defendant
appealed the trial court's denial of his motion.2" '
On appeal defendant argued that a jury award of damages for pain
and suffering should be based upon a multiple of that plaintiff's special
damages.2"' The court, however, rejected defendant's argument and
held the following:
Under Georgia law, pain and suffering in the past, present, and future
are measured by the enlightened conscience of a fair and impartial
jury, There exists no rule or yardstick against which damages for pain
and suffering are to be measured, as suggested by the appellant, who
would have such damages as some multiple of special damages for
medical expenses and lost wages. The reason is simple; if such an
objective yardstick is applied, then the young, the old, the sick, the
disabled, the rich, the poor, the unemployed, and the underemployed
would be treated differently than the fully employed when having such
special damage cap would apply.'
In 1987 the Georgia General Assembly adopted O.C.G.A. section 51-125.123 in which it established a bifurcated procedure to govern the

award of punitive damages in civil actions.2 4 Pursuant to section 5112-5.1, in the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding, the jury must
determine, based upon the evidence submitted at trial, whether an
award of punitive damages is warranted.2 °5 If the jury finds that an

197. Id., 472 S.E.2d at 511-12 (citations omitted).
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award of punitive damages is warranted, then the case proceeds to the
second phase of the bifurcated proceeding in which the jury determines
the amount of punitive damages to be awarded.'
In Boyett v. Webster, 7 the court of appeals addressed the admissibility of evidence of prior DUIs of the defendant in the first phase of the
bifurcated proceeding. In Boyett plaintiff brought suit against defendant
as a result of an automobile accident in which plaintiff was injured and
in which defendant was charged with driving under the influence. At
trial plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence that defendant had
previously been convicted of driving under the influence as support for
her claim for punitive damages. The trial court, however, excluded the
evidence from the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding. The jury
subsequently returned a verdict for plaintiff for compensatory damages
but declined to assess punitive damages against defendant.2 "s
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
ordered a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. 2" The court
first noted that O.C.G.A. section 51-12-5.1 requires that the liability for
punitive damages be determined separately from the amount of punitive
damages to be awarded.2 10 The court noted, however, that "for punitive damages to be authorized, there must be evidence of wilful
misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, or oppression, or that entire
want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences."2 ' The court recognized that as a general rule,
evidence of prior acts or omissions of a defendant is not admissible on
the issue of liability for punitive damages.1 2 The court, however,
stated:
An exception to the general rule regarding excluding evidence of
similar acts or omissions allows admission of this evidence when the
defendant's driving under the influence in the incident at issue is an
aggravating circumstance which would authorize the trier of fact to
impose punitive damages. In that circumstance, the extent of the
defendant's wilful misconduct, wantonness and entire want of care in
driving under the influence cannot be gauged solely by focusing on the
single incident in issue and disregarding other incidents of similar
conduct. Consequently, evidence that the defendant previously drove

206. Id. § 51-12-5.1(d)(2).
207. 224 Ga. App. 843, 482 S.E.2d 377 (1996), cert. granted, No. S97C0856.
208. Id. at 843, 482 S.E.2d at 379.
209. Id. at 847, 482 S.E.2d at 381-82.
210. Id at 844, 482 S.E.2d at 379.
211. Id., 482 S.E.2d at 380 (citing Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115,118,365
S.E.2d 827, 830 (1988)).
212. Id. at 845, 482 S.E.2d at 380.
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under the influence on another occasion is admissible in the liability
phase of a bifurcated trial because such evidence is relevant to the
issue of whether punitive damages should be awarded."18
Although the court recognized that a danger of prejudice exists by
permitting evidence that the defendant previously drove under the
influence to be admitted during the first phase of the trial, the court
stated that the "evidence's relevance on liability for punitive damages
outweighs any prejudice if the jury is fully charged that this evidence
goes only to liability for punitive damages and not to the issues of
liability or damages in the particular incident on trial."21 4
The decision in Boyett appears to conflict with the prior court of
appeals decision in Holt v. Grinnell.1 5 In Holt the court of appeals
held that evidence of prior convictions of driving under the influence "is
conduct relevant to the trier of fact's determination of 'what amount of
[punitive] damages will be sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the
defendant in light of the circumstances of the case.'"216

Further, in

Holt the court of appeals specifically noted that by admitting the
evidence only in the second phase of the bifurcated trial, "there is no
danger that the jury could improperly use it to determine the defendant's negligence in the incident at issue."21 7 In reaching its decision
in Boyett, however, the court of appeals remarkably stated that the
decision in Holt "did not address directly whether evidence of prior DUIs
was admissible in the first phase of a bifurcated trial."218 The supreme
court recently granted certiorari in Boyett. However, as of the date of
publication, the court has yet to issue its opinion.
VII.

BovINE JURISPRUDENCE

Bearden,219

In Simmons v.
plaintiffs cow crossed through a broken
fence and wandered onto defendant's property. Plaintiff, who had been
feuding with defendant for several years, brought suit against defendant
for the return of the cow. 220 After a bench trial, the trial court ordered
the return of plaintiff's cow; however, the trial court refused to award
damages because plaintiff "failled] to identify the cow to [defendant] and

213. Id. (citations omitted).
214. Id.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

212 Ga. App. 520, 441 S.E.2d 874 (1994).
Id. at 522, 441 S.E.2d at 875 (citations omitted).
Id., 441 S.E.2d at 876.
224 Ga. App. at 845, 482 S.E.2d at 380.
222 Ga. App. 430, 474 S.E.2d 250 (1996).
Id. at 430, 474 S.E.2d at 250.
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request its return prior to trial."22 The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgment and held that because defendant did not acquire
the cow by unlawful means, plaintiff was required to prove conversion
of the cow in order to recover damages.222 Therefore, plaintiff's failure
to prove that he had demanded return of the cow or that defendant had
refused to return the cow was fatal to plaintiff's claim for damages. 2 s
VIII.

CONCLUSION

It is literally impossible to survey adequately within the necessary
editorial confines of this Article the large volume of tort law decisions
rendered during the preceding year by the Georgia Supreme Court and
the Georgia Court of Appeals. Many of the issues raised in the cases
rendered this past year deserve page after page of indepth discussion
and analysis. Next year's tort survey will almost certainly address at
length several issues that are currently before the Georgia Supreme
Court, including, and perhaps most important, the fate of the Alterman
Foods test in slip and fall cases.

221. Id. at 431, 474 S.E.2d at 250.
222. Id., 474 S.E.2d at 251.
223. Id. In the author's review of prior tort surveys, it appears that the prior authors
have completely ignored the area of bovine jurisprudence, including such important
decisions as Holingsworth v. Thomas, 148 Ga. App. 38, 250 S.E.2d 791 (1978) (holding
that ordinary risks of dairy business include cows unexpectedly swishing their tails) and
Cone u. Shaffer, 146 Ga. App. 472, 246 S.E.2d 714 (1978) (holding that issue as to whether
removal of dead calf from uterus of cow should have been accomplished while dead calf was
whole or through dissection was jury question precluding summary judgment).

